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Respondents.

Petitioner, Daniel Scott Cox, Pro Se, appologizes to
the Court for any unintended offense as regards to the filing of
materials.

His sole objective was and is to perfect and protect

his rights but he will refrain from any future filings which
appear to be questionable.

Petitioner certifies that this

petition is presented in good faith and not for delay based upon
the issues at Indentures 2 — 7

here—in.

Petitioner files this Petition for Rehearing per Rule
35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure because the
Memorandum Decision overlooks or misapprehends:
(1) Petitioner's Motions
Motions for Sanctions

for

Protective

orders

(2) the Court of Appeal ? s
with UCA 78-2a-3<4>,

mandatory obligations to

and his

comply

(3) that per UCA 35-1-82.53, an "Order on Review" by the
Commission is a FINAL ORDER, that per R568-1-4(0) such
<1>

"Order on Review" is to be "governed by the provisions of
Section
63—46b—14", that
such
"Order on Review" must
be
considered to have been issued
on 17 November 1997, that
Petitioner's Petition
is taken
against
this
"Order
on
Review", and that the Court of Appeals therefore has subject
matter jurisdiction as the Petition is from a final "Order",
(4) that
the exceptions of UCA 63-46b-14(2)(a) &
(b) DO
apply and that Petitioner is not required to exhaust his
administrtive remedies, and
(5) that the
14 July
1997 date is not the date of
the
commission's "Order on Review"
(17 November
1997),
and
therefore cannot be used to determine whether
or not
Petitioner met the 30 day time limit of UCA 63-46b-14(3)(a).
The Memorandum Decision therefore violates Petitioner's
Constitutional rights under Article I, Sections 1, 7, 11 atnd 24
of the Utah Constitution, and Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the
U-S- Constitution as presented here-in, justifying a Rehearing.
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE COURT'S MEMORANDUM
1.0

DECISION

Petitioner has met all of the timelines required for

Appeal to the Commission and to the Court of Appeals1.1

On 7/14/97, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) without

explaination or finding of fact:
*
Dismissed Respondents 7 March 1997 Motion to
Dismiss
which they had
failed
to sustain
and which was fully
disputed by Petitioner and Dr. Avery's letter of 10 Mar 97.
*
Denied Petitioner's 8 May 1997 Uncontested Motions for
Sanctions against Respondents for falsifications, omissions,
misrepresentations, and
like misconduct presented
to the
Commission in their 7 March 1997 Motion to Dismiss.
*
Denied Petitioner's 8 May and 24 June 1997 Uncontested
Motions for Sanctions for Respondents refusal to
release
Interrogatories to Petitioner as "Ordered" by the ALJ*
Dismissed Petitioner's Uncontested Motion
for Summary
Judgement which was supported by 50+ unchallenged records.
1.2

On 30/31 July 1997, 17 days after the A L J ? s "Order",

Petitioner filed his Appeal

(Motion for Review) with the
(2)

Commission and ALJ under UCA 63-46(b)-12 as allowed by R568-14 CM) and UCA 35-1-82.53(1) on grounds that the dismissal and
denials of his Uncontested Motions were "Arbitrary and
Capricious", "Contrary to Whole Record", and an "Abuse of
Discretion", issues of law under UCA 63—46(b)—16, complying with
the 30 day time limit specified under UCA 63-46(b)-12(1)(a).
1-3

The Commission, instead of issuing their "Written Order

on Review" as mandated by UCA 63-46b-12(6)(a), notified
Petitioner of a new Hearing date.
*
Notice of
15 September
1997 setting
Hearing for
9
December 1997
*
Notice of 27 October
1997 setting Hearing for 2 March
1998
1.4

Petitioner requested status of his Appeal, and stay of

the scheduled Hearing because of Respondents failure to obey
Commission " O r d e r s " r e g a r d i n g d i s c o v e r y and t h e
failure to act upon Petitioner's Appeal

Commission's

(Motion for Review).

*
19 Sept 1997, Letter requesting status of Appeal
*
23 Sept 1997, Motion for Stay of Hearing
*
19 Oct 1997, Letter requesting status of Appeal
*
28 Oct 1997, Letter concerning Appeal
*
08 Nov 1997, Letter to Commission giving notice that as
of 17 November 1997, absent
any action by the Commission,
that Petitioner
would
have exhausted
his administrative
remedies, and was entitled to proceed "to file for Review by
the Appellate Court" (Attachment A)
*
1-5

12 Nov 1997, Letter to ALJ requesting relief on Hearing
On 8 December

1997 Petitioner filed his Petition for

Review, Reversal and Award where the Commission's "Order on
Review" was presumed to sustain the ALJ's "Order" and was
"considered to have been entered" on 17 November 1997.
1.6

UCA 35-1-82.53(2) clearly states that "Orders on

Review" are

final agency orders.
(3)

"The order of the commission on review is final,
aside by the Court of Appeals." (Emphasis added)
1-7

unless set

Worker's Compensation Rule R56B-1-4(0) states:
"Any petition for judicial
review of the Commission's Order
on Motion for Review shall be governed by the provisions of
Section 63-46b-14 ? U.C.A."

1.8

That Petitioner's Petition for Review, Reversal and

Award was filed 21 calender and 20 legal days after the
Commission's "Order on Review" of 17 November

1997 ?

therefore

complying with the 30 day requirement of UCA 63—46b—14(3)(a).
PETITION FOR REVIEW -BASIS
2.
The
Memorandum
Decision
Uncontested Motions for Sanctions

Overlooks

Petitioner's

3.
The
Memorandum
Decision
Overlooks
Petitioner's
Uncontested
Motion
for Protective Order Regarding Respondents
Refusal to Release UOSH Allowed "Exposure and Medical Records"
Properly Reguested under UOSH Statutes and Regulations
4.
The Memorandum
Decision
Overlooks Mandatory
Duties
Under UCA 7S-2a-3(4)„ and Misapprehends Petitioner's Right
For
Review, Reversal and Award Of The Commission's "Order on Review",
Where Such Order Is A Final Order Over Which The Court of Appeals
Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
Petitioner respectfuly cites UCA 78—2a—3<4>:
"The Court of Appeals SHALL comply with the requirements of
Title 63, Chapter 46b ?
Administrative Proceedures Act, in
its review of agency adjudicative proceedings."
("SHALL"
being interpreted as "Mandatory" per *Varian—Eimac, 767 P2d
570' — Emphasis added)
Tfius t h e C o u r t

of

A p p e a l s must t h e r e f o r e

comply

with

UCA 63-46b-12(l) which states in relevant part:
"If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any
adjudicative proceeding
to seek review of an order
by the
agency ... the aggrieved party may file a written
request
for review within
30 days after
the issuance of
the order
..."
(Emphasis added)
Where the Labor Commission Rules and Worker's
Compensation Statutes permit Petitioner to file under UCA 63-46b(4)

12 as stated.
"Any party in interest who is dissatisfied with the order
entered by an administrative law judge may seek review of
that order
with the
commision
by complying
with
the
commission's
rules governing
that
review."
UCA 35—1 —
82-53(1)
"Any party to an adjudicative proceeding
seeking review of
an Order by the Agency may file a written request for review
in succor d^nne with the provisions of Sections 63-46b-12 ...
A
Motion
for Review
of ANY
order
entered
by an
Administrative
Law Judge may be filed
pursuant
to the
provisions
of Section
63-46b-12, UCA."
R568-1-4(M)
(Emphasis added)
Thus Petitioner properly appealed for administrative
review under UCA 63-46b-12 the ALJ's "Order" of 14 July 1997
dismissing or denying Petitioner's Uncontested Motions-

The

Commission there-afterward had a mandatory obligation to issue a
"Written Order on Review" which by statute is a "FINAL ORDERS":
"Within a reasonable time ... the agency
... SHALL issue a
written order on review-" UCA 63-46b-12(6)(a)
"The order of the commission on review is final, unless set
aside by the Court of Appeals." UCA 35-1-82-53(2) (Emphasis
added)
Worker's Compensation Rules and statutes unequivocably
dictate the manner in which such "Orders on Review" Are to be
governed when submitted for judicial

review:

"Any petition for judicial
review of the Commission's Order
on Motion for Review shall be governed by the provisions of
Section 63-46b-14, U-C-A-"
R568-l-4(0)
"A party aggrieved may obtain
judicial
agency action ..." UCA 63-46b-14(l)

review of

final

Which is proper because the commission's "Order on
Review" is a final agency action over which the Court of Appeals
has subject matter jurisdiction through UCA 78-2a-3(4).
Petitioner respectfuly points out that there is a
(5)

significant and substantive difference between UCA 73-2a-3(2)(a)
as relied upon by the Court and UCA 78-2a-3(4) as demonstrated
above.

Reliance on UCA 78-2a-3(2)(a) restricts Appellate

jurisdiction to final orders resulting from formal ad judicative
proceedings while compliance with UCA 78-2a-3(4) mandates subject
matter jurisdiction over ANY "Order" of an ALJ brought forward
for judicial review under and through UCA 63-46B-12.

And the

language of UCA 63—46b—14(i) does not restrict subject matter
jurisdiction to orders from formal adjudicative proceedings. As
demonstrated above, subject matter jurisdiction may arise from
ANY "Order" of an ALJ, thus any time in the adjudicative process.
The legislative intent of the Worker's Compensation Act
was to confer subject matter jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals
over ANY "Order" not just "Final Orders resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings".
"The Court
of Appeals has jurisdiction
or annul
ANY order
of the commission
(Emphasis added)

to review, reverse,
..."
UCA
53-1-86

"Agency means
... commission ... officer
... including ...
agency employees, or other persons acting
on behalf of or
under
the authority
of the agency head ..."
UCA 63—46b—
2(1)(b)
Thus the Worker's Compensation Statutes and Rules
clearly invoke subject matter jurisdiction over ANY "Order" of an
ALJ to the Court of Appeals through UCA 63—46b—12 by virtue of
i

the mandatory compliance required by UCA 78—2a—3(4).

And the

misapprehension or inadvertent
overlooking of this
jurisdiction
is
contrary to the Legislative Intent of the Statutes, and violates
Petitioner's rights to due process under Article I, Sections 1 &
11 of the Utah Constitution as well as Amendment XIV, Section 1
(6)

of the U.S. Constitution.
5The Court's Decision
Memorandum Overlooks Or
Misapprehends
Petitioner's Riqht
To Review Of His Petition Without Exhaustion
Of All Administrative Remedies
UCA 63—46b—14(2) cites exceptions under which
exhaustion of remedies is not required.
"A party may seek judicial
review only after exhausting all
administrative remedies available, except
that: <a> a party
seeking
judicial
review need not exhaust
administrative
remedies if this chapter
OR any other
statute states that
exhaustion is not required."
(Emphasis added)
The Memorandum Decision misapprehends these exceptions
stating "Utah Code Ann $ 63-46b-14 (1997) governs '• judicial
review of final agency action. 7

With limited exceptions not

applicable in this case."
The two exceptions under UCA 63-46b-14(2)(a) are
presented in the disjunctive form, therefore if either exception
is found to exist, the requirement to exhaust
remedies is waived and is not applicable.

administrative

Both exceptions

Bre

applicable, thus exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
required.
5.1

SECOND EXCEPTION - ANY OTHER STATUTE
Petitioner again cites UCA 35—1—86 which places no

limitations on the Court's jurisdiction regarding the exhaustion
of remedies.
"The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse or
annul ANY order of the commission.." 3kf_
Thus, this statute declares that since ANY order may be
reviewed, it is not necessary to proceed to a Hearing as
misapprehended by the Memorandum Decision which states:
"Because no hearing has occurred in the agency, no agency
(7)

decision constituting final agency action has issued."
But this statement overlooks the fact that the
Commision's "Order on Review" which must be considered to have
been isued on 17 November 1997 is in fact a final agency action.
Petitioner points out the Constitutional

implications

of this oversight as evident from his own circumstance where the
Worker's Compenstion Rules state:
"Any party ... may file a written request for review ...
Unless so files the Order will become the award
of
the
Commission and will be final." R568-1-4CM)
Thus had Petitioner failed to file for review of the
ALJ's denial of his Motions for Sanctions where no findings of
fact were made, the ALJ's Order would have become the final award
of the Commission - which 3LW3ird would have not been Reviewable
before this Court because Petitioner would have failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies of appeal as allowed by this rule.
And now, if this Court denies Review, then Petitioner will have
been denied the very due process he sought to protect by
conforming to the Worker's compensation rules and statutes.

This

condition would result in the Unconstitutional denial of due
process under Article I ? Section 11 of the Utah Constitution and
Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution.
The consequence had Petitioner not filed for review
before the Commission, or if this Court denies his right to
Review, will be that the ALJ's denial will stand and the
falsifications, misrepresentations, omissions, refusals to
cooperate with discovery, fraudulent medical diagnosis etc as
clearly demonstrated to exist in Petitioner's Motions for
<8)

Sanctions will remain before the Commission and ALJ as though
they were truthful representations.

And where the Commission and

ALJ have sole jurisdiction over findings of fact, and any error
must remain there. Petitioner's Constitutional rights to due
process are

violated because of the failure to assure an unbiased

Hearing where any fact found in favor of Respondents based upon
these improprieties would not be subject to appeal.
Further, the purpose of Petitioner's Motion for Summary
Judgement was to terminate Respondents maintenance of an
unmeritorious denial of compensbi1ity where they assert a
pre-existing condition disputed by 6 doctors and 1 Psychologist
yet present no defense as demonstrated by the facts at Indentures
1.1 here—in, and Petitioner had already accrued substantial and
unnecessary expenses associated with Respondents unmeritorious
denial of compensability which have subsequently escalated now
including $3,727 in out of pocket expenses and $2,628 dollars in
unpaid legal fees (Ref Brief on Constitutional Reasonableness of
Sanctions, Damages & Costs dated 2 June 1997).
Statute UCA 35—1—86 provides for such a circumstance,
allowing review without exhaustion of administrative remedies,
thus protecting Petitioner's: (1) right to "have remedy ...
without ... unnecessary delay" as guaranteed by Section 11 of the
Utah Constitution,

(b) right to a "... just, speedy and

inexpensive determination of Chis3 action" as intended by Rule 1
of the Utah Civil Rules of Procedure, and

(3) right to obtain

compensation in a "simple, said speedy" manner, "eliminating the
expense, delay and uncertainty in having to prove negligence on
(9)

the part of employer"

(See Wi1 stead, 407 P2d 692; Park Utah

Cnsol- Mines, 36 P2d 979; Barber, 135 P2d 2 6 6 ) .
5.2

FIRST EXCEPTION - PROVISIONS QF CHAPTER 63-46B
Petitioner respectfuly cites UCA 63—46b—1(4) from this

chapter which states in relevant part:
"This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior to the
beginning
of an adjudicative proceeding
... from
... (b)
granting a timely motion ... for summary judgement
if the
requirements of ... Rule 56 ... of the Utah Rules of
Civil
Procedure are met by the moving party - - -" (Enphasis added)
Thus, the effect of this provision on UCA 63—46b—
14(2)(a) is to assure that summary judgements are

facilitated by

review without exhaustion of administrative remedies — similarly
to the effect of UCA 35—1—86 as discussed above-

And as

demonstrated by the facts at Indenture 1.1 here—in, Sumary
Judgement was fully warrented because there was no dispute as to
the facts and arguments of Petitioner's Motion for Summary
Judgement, nor was there any dispute or denial by Respondents
that they had based their 7 March 1997 Motion for Dismissal on
falsifications, misrepresentations, omissions, violations of
"Orders" to produce Interrogatories and like misconduct.
5-3

Effect Of Exceptions Under UCA 63-46b-14(2)(a)
Where the Memorandum Decision overlooks or

misapprehends the applicability of the exceptions of UCA 63—46b—
14(2)(a) to Petitioner's Petition for Review, Petitioner would be
denied his right to review without exhaustion of his
administrative remedies as conferred by UCA 35-1-86 and UCA 6 3 46b—1(4) and would therefore be denied his right to due process
under Article I, Sections 1, 7 & 11 of the Utah Constitution as
<10)

well as Amendment

XIV, Section i of the U.S. Constitution.

Petitioner also observes that had the ALJ awarded
Summary Judgment to Petitioner that Respondents would have had
right to judicial review under UCA 63-46b-14 without exhaustion
of administratives, and that the denial of Petitioner's right
of equivalent judicial review concerning the disposition of his
Uncontested Motion for Summary Judgement without exhaustion of
administrative remedies would violate the equal

protection

clauses of Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution and
Amendment
5.4

XIV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution.

Effect of UCA 65-46b-14(2)(b)(ii)
Here—in, the Court of Appeals is granted discretion to

relieve a party of exhaustion of administrative remedies if the
exhaustion would "result in irreparable harm disproportionate to
the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion."

Id

Petitioner simply argues that even if the Court held
that exhaustion was required under UCA 63-46b-14(2)(a), that the
circumstances of Petitioner's case would warrent granting of this
discretionary relief.

Where there are

approximately 80,000

industrial injuries each year in Utah, it is unthinkable to
condone the egregious practices used by Respondents: (a) to
improperly deny compensability where six

(6) doctors and One (1)

Psychologist assert that Petitioner does not have a pre-existing
condition, and/or that his injury was work related,
improperly seek dismissal, and

(b) to

(c) to force Petitioner to

shoulder the burden of a 2 year adjudicative process to obtain
compensation when Respondents justification for their denial of
(11)

compensability is fully disputed, offer no denial as regards to
their misconduct characterized in Petitioner's Uncontested
Motions for Sanctions, and fail to contest, dispute or otherwise
controvert Petitioner's Uncontested Motion for Summary Judgement
(See Indenture 1.1 here—in).

Any such precedent would allow

employers or insurers the opportunity to totally subvert the
Legislative intent and Constitutionality of the Worker's
Compensation Act for the sake of their personal financial

gain

while depriving thousands of their rights to due process.
The Court of Appeals must therefore grant this
discretion to Petitioner so that his Petition may be heard for
the benefit of all injured workers, as reflected by the prior
opinions in 'Norris' and

'Arnica'.

"We do not mean to say that when doctors give what appear to
be convincing
opinions that they will
be considered
as
contradicted
by
the
introduction
of
some
opposite,
unreasoable unsubstantiated make—believe
opinion." Norris,
61 P2d 416
"... when the moving party has presented evidence sufficient
to support a judgement in its favor, and the opposing party
fails to submit
contrary
evidence, a trial
court
is
justified
in concluding
that no genuine
issue of fact is
present or would be present at trial." Arnica, 768 P2d 957
To protect the broader public interest, the exhaustion
of administrative remedies must not be required, and Petitioner's
Petition for Review must be granted.
6The Memorandum Decision's Reliance Qn 14 July 1997 As The
Date From Which Petitioner's Petition For Judicial Review Should
Be Based Misapprehends The Facts
"Petitioner filed a request for judicial review of the July
14,
1997 order
of an administrative
law judge
denying
Petitioner's motion for summary
judgement ..." (Pg2, Para 1
of Memorandum Decision)
This statement is not accurate.
(12)

Petitioner properly

and timely filed his appeal

(Motion for Review) with the

Commission on 31 July 1997 under UCA 63-46b-12 in order to obtain
their decision via an "Order on Review" which the Commission had
a

mandatory obligation to issue per UCA 63—46b-12(6>(a)

being mandatory per

(Shall

'Varian-Eimac Id')-

The Commission's failure to issue their "Order on
Review" in a timely manner as mandated by statute, and their
action to force Petitioner to a Hearing without

Interrogatories

previously "Ordered" to be provided by Respondents by the
Commission, violated Petitioner's rights to due process.
To protect his rights to due process, Petitioner gave
notice on 8 November

1997 that he would consider his

administrative remedies exhausted as of 17 November

1997, and

"may therefore proceed to file for Review by the Appellate
Court."-

This notice was based upon Petitioner's review of UCA

63-46b-13 & UCA 63-46b-14(3)(a) where it was appropriate to file
within 30 days of the date that the "Order constituting final
agency action is issued or is considered to have been issued."
Thus on 17 November

1997, when no "Order on Review"

was issued. Petitioner understood the Commission to affirm the
"Order" of the ALJ and on that day "CONSIDERED" the Commission's
"Order on Review" to have issued.

Thus, Petitioner's 8 December

1997 petition for judicial review regarding the substance of the
ALJ's 14 July 1997 "Order" as affirmed by the Commission's

"Order

on Review" was properly and timely presented to the Court of
Appeals.
November

This filing was 21 calendar and 20 legal days after 17
1997, thus complying with UCA 63-46b-14(3>(a).
(13)

"Any petition
for judicial review of the Commissions Order
on Motion for Review shall be governed by Section 63—46b—14,
U.C.A." R568-l-4<0>
The Memorandum Decision presumes that the 14 July 1997
date governs, but statutes do not allow the direct appeal of an
ALJ ? s order, and Petitioner complied with the statutes to obtain
the Commission's "Order on Review".
THE FACT THAT THE COMMISSION FAILED OR REFUSED TO PROPERLY
AND TIMELY PERFORM
THEIR MANDATORY STATUTORY OBLIGATION
TO
ISSUE THEIR "ORDER ON REVIEW"
CANNOT BAR PETITIONER FROM
PROTECTING HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS.
The 30 day timeline for filing of Petitioner's petition
for judicial review must run from 17 November

1997-

Therefore

the Court of Appeals has subject matter jurisdiction.

The

Misaprehension of the Memorandum Decision violates Petitioner's
rights to due proces under the Utah and U.S. Constitutions.
7.
The Citation
In Regards
Memorandum Is Improper

To *Varian-Eimac*

In

The Decision

This 'Varian-Eimac" precedent relates to the Courts
subject matter jurisdiction where the time limit for filing has
been overstepped.

The 15 day time limit applicable in

Eimac' has been repealed and no longer applies.
of UCA 63-46b-14 controls.
time limit

'Varian-

The 30 day limit

Petitioner has fully met the 30 day

(See Indentures 1 & subs here-in and 6 above),

therefore the citation of

'Starian-Eimac ? is improper as the

Court of Apeals has subject matter jurisdiction because the
filing times at both the Commision level and Appellate Court
level are

fully complied with.

Imposition of the 15 day time

limit would violate existing statutes and would violate
Petitioner's Constitutional rights to due process.
(14)

8.

Summar i z at i on
The Memorandum Decision overlooks or misapprehends:

(a)

statutes and rules which assure Petitioner's rights to due
process and which the Court of Appeals must comply with thru UCA
78—2a—3(4),

(b) the applicability of the exceptions under UCA 63—

46b—14(2) which demonstrate that Petitioner is not required to
exhaust his administrative remedies in order to obtain access to
the Court of Appeals without denial in order to establish his
right to compensation by Summary Judgement without unnecessary
delay, and

(c) the facts and clearly stated statutory language of

UCA 35-1-82-53, UCA 63-46b-12, UCA 63-46b-14(3)(a) and Rule Rule
R568-1-4(M) which demonstrate that Petitioner's timelimit for
filing his Petition for Review, Reversal and Award with the Court
of Appeals runs from 17 November

1997 not 14 July 1997 and that

Petitioner has met the statutory time limits for filing with the
Commission and with the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, Petitioner respectfully prays for a
Rehearing in order to assure that his rights under Article I,
Sections 1, 7 & 11 of the Utah Constitution and under

Amendment

XIV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution Bre not violated.

Respectfully submitted this lY day of June 1997

Daniel Scott Cox
Pro Se
(15)

